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ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL KNAPSACK BASED SEALED BID AUCTION  
 
Navya Chodisetti 
 
Abstract: The need of totally secure online auction has led to the invention of many 
auction protocols. But as new attacks are developed, auction protocols also require 
corresponding strengthening. We analyze the auction protocol based on the well-known 
mathematical public-key knapsack problem for the design of asymmetric public-key 
knapsack trapdoor cryptosystem. Even though the knapsack system is not 
cryptographically secure, it can be used in certain auction situations. We describe the 
limitations of the protocol like detecting and solving the tie between bidders, malicious 
behavior of participants and also selection of price set by the seller and offer solutions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The word “auction” is derived from the Latin word called auctus, which means 
“increase” [from a small to a greater price].  The normal design of auction procedure is 
the ascending auction where the price of the product is raised such that only one bidder 
remains in the game. But the term “auction” now covers a wide variety of forms. Some 
auctions are descending to the extent that the bidder stops the process, some are public 
and observable in open auction and some are private in case of written and sealed bid 
auctions. The need of totally secure online auction has led to the invention of many new 
auction protocols. The development of these auctions is based on combining old 
protocols with the new science of public-key cryptography, complexity theory [1]-[8], 
and quantum information processing [9],[10].  
Traditional auctions are analyzed into four basic types which are often referred as 
standard auctions: these are the English auction, the Dutch auction, the first-price sealed-
bid auction, and the second price auction.   
English auction. The English auction is also known as the open, oral, or ascending-bid 
auction. This is the oldest as well as the most wide spread auction mechanism. In this 
auction the auctioneer starts the auction by announcing the starting bid. Then the 
participant’s bids increases the price successively, which must be higher than the current 
price to get accepted. The auction runs until one bidder remains in process. This auction 
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can be run either by auctioneer announcing the prices or by bidders submitting bids 
shouting out loud or electronically in case of online auctions. 
The price paid by the winner in an English auction depends on the price at which her/her 
rival exits the auction. If the bidder quits when the price reaches his/her valuation, then 
the price paid by the winner is equal to the second-highest valuation among bidders’ 
valuations.  
Dutch auction. The Dutch auction is an open descending-price counterpart of English 
auction.  In this auction, the auctioneer starts at a very high price, so high that no bidder 
is interested in buying the object at this price. Then the price is gradually lowered, until 
one bidder signals his acceptance to the current price. Dutch auctions do not 
progressively reveal their valuation for the auctioned item, since only information that 
bidders have is that the auction in over. Each bidder must choose how high to bid without 
the knowledge of other bidders’ interest in the item. The Dutch auction only reveals the 
price at which the winner values the good for sale. 
To consider an example of Dutch auction, consider a software company that starts the 
auction at $3,000 for its shares. If there are no bidders, the price is lowered by $200. The 
shares will be sold once the bidder accepts the last announced price by the auctioneer, say 
$1,800. Once all bids are placed, the bids are considered from highest bid down until all 
of the shares are assigned. The price that each bidder pays is based on the lowest price of 
all allotted bidders. Therefore, even if A bid $300 for his 2,000 shares, if the last 
successful bid is $100, A will have to pay $100 for his 2,000 shares.  
First-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In this auction, bidders simultaneously submit a 
single bid to the auctioneer in a sealed envelope without knowing other bidders’ bids. By 
the end of the deadline, the envelopes are opened and submitted bids are evaluated. The 
bidder with the highest bid is declared as the winner. There is no interaction among 
bidders as in English auction and the bidders submit their bid based on their willingness 
to pay and assuming others bidders’ valuation. 
Second-price sealed-bid (SPSB). This is similar to the first-price sealed bid. Here each 
bidder privately submits a single bid and the winner is the bidder who makes the highest 
bid. 
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Example: Let the highest bid other than me be denoted by R. Assuming that my value for 
the product is $2000. When R < 2000 any bid above R will make me win the bid and any 
bid below R will make me lose the bid and when R > 2000 bidding above R will me 
make me lose money but win the object and bidding below R gives me 0 payoff. 
Digital Auctions. Auctions have become a major phenomenon in the field of electronic 
commerce. A digital auction is viewed as a set of electronic protocols which allows a 
collection of bidders to buy a thing at an auction with the lowest possible price, while a 
seller wants the bidder to buy the product with highest possible price. 
             
Figure 1 : Digital Auction 
They are many factors concerning the design of a successful online auction protocol that 
include the following:  
• Secrecy of bidding price: Bidding prices of bidders should not be revealed even 
after the completion of the bid. 
• Validity of a successful bid: Anyone participating in the bid should be able to 
verify the validity of the bid. 
• Fairness: only the registered bidder must be able to bid the auction. 
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• Anonymity of winner: No information should be revealed about the identity of 
any bidder. 
• Correctness: Determining the correct winner of the bid and its corresponding 
selling price. 
To satisfy the above requirements, the use of cryptographic techniques becomes essential 
[11]-[22].   
The online auction site eBay was established in 1995, and it has now expanded into many 
countries and it makes billions of dollars each year. Many believe that in spite of its 
success the auction mechanism used by eBay and other auction sites are not perfect. For 
example, eBay runs many simultaneous sequential auctions and the same kind of goods 
may be on going in hundreds, sometimes thousands of auctions, which makes it difficult 
for a potential buyer to choose an auction to place his/her bid. Another problem with 
these auctions is that eBay typically finishes its auction at a fixed time, which allows the 
bidders to place a bid moments before the auction terminates causing loss of revenue for 
both seller and eBay.  
 
OVERVIEW OF BASIC TOOLS 
Oblivious Transfer. Oblivious transfer is a cryptographic protocol where the sender 
transfers one of the potentially many pieces of information to a receiver, but remains 
oblivious as to which piece has been transferred. The idea of oblivious transfer (OT) was 
first proposed by Rabin [23]. 
 
In OT the sender S has only one secret m and this message have a probability 0.5 to reach 
the receiver R. The receiver R does not want S to know, if it gets m or not. For 12OT , 
sender S has two secret messages 1m and 2m , the receiver will get one of them by the 
choice of receivers choice. The bit chosen by the receiver is unknown to sender because 
he/she wants it that way. And also receiver must not know any information other than 
what he/she has chosen. Similarly 1ZOT is a natural extension of 
1
2OT in case of z secrets. 
Where the secrets 1m , 2m  , 3m ……. zm  and is willing to disclose only one among them to 
receiver. Oblivious transfer is the fundamental primitive in many cryptographic 
applications and secure distributed computations and has many applications such as 
private information retrieval (PIR), fair electronic contract signing [24]. 
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OT can be used to generate random numbers, but the randomness can only be guaranteed 
on a computational complexity basis. Randomness can also be viewed probabilistically 
[25] or from mathematical and physical basis [26]-[29]. 
 
Knapsack Problem. The knapsack problem is a mathematically attractive proposition 
for cryptography and the Merkle and Hellman public key asymmetric-key cryptography 
was based on knapsack problem [30]. Although it was eventually broken [2], it still is a 
useful scheme to use in certain applications.  
 
Assume key ).......( 2,1 nkkkK = where skn ' are integers and n is the plain text bit length. 
Let ),.......( 1 nssS = be a plain text where, ns )......1(}1,0{ nn =∀∈  then the encryption of 
the plain text S using the knapsack cryptosystem is done by the formula  
∑===
n
i ii
xkSKZ
1
. . 
From the formula calculating Z is really simple whereas recovery of S from the same is 
really difficult since K is randomly chosen. But the knapsack problem becomes really 
simple if we choose the random numbers in a way other than choosing each element of K 
is larger than the sum of the preceding elements. 
 If ∑
−
=
=∀>
1
1
)....1(
i
j
ji nikk  the cipher can be generated as ∑ ==
n
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1
.  
The plain text X can be recovered from the key K and the cipher text nz .  
 
KNAPSACK BASED AUCTION PROTOCOL 
This survey examines the auction protocol described by Ibrahim [20] where there is a 
seller and a set of n bidders come to an agreement on the selling price of a certain 
product. The role of the auctioneer becomes obsolete in this case since only the seller and 
the set of bidders are involved in this protocol.  
 
Firstly the seller publicly announces a set of prices in an increasing order to the bidders. 
Bidders are allowed to choose any price from the set of prices and make a sealed bid. 
Once the bidder makes the bid the problem related to the security of the bid must be 
considered. To do this seller defines a set of secret keys, each key corresponding to price 
in price set in a super increasing order. Once the bidder makes his/her choice by selecting 
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a price from the price set the seller assigns him/her with a secret key; this is later used by 
bidder to perform the additive sharing with other bidders to stay anonymous.  
Seller Initialization the Following: 
1. Select a set of prices }......,{ 21 npppP =  where ijpp ij <∀<  in an increasing 
order. 
2. Once the prices set P is selected now the seller defines a set of n super increasing 
random integers, }......,{ 21 ncccC =  where ).....1(
1
1
nicc i
j ji
=∀> ∑ −= , such that the 
seller assigns each ic  to respective ip  
3. There is an another set where the seller select a set of random integers 
}......,{ 21 irrrR =  such that ∑ = =∀∈Λ=
i
n pnn
inNrqr
1
)....1(mod0  where q is a 
large prime ∑ =>
k
j j
cq
1
 
4. The seller defines vector of k flags }......,{ 21 kfffF =  where ikf i ∀== 0)......1(
where }1,0{∈if . 
 
 
Figure 2: Seller and bidder in Auction 
Bidders Makes the Following Choices: 
1.   Bidder )....1( niBi∀  selects a price from set P. 
 
Oblivious Transfer of Strings to Securely Transfer the Secret Code: 
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      1.  Bidder iB  interacts with the seller through Oblivious transfer 
1
kOT of strings to get 
the secret randomized code, qrcc jxjxj mod
1 += by choosing a respective secret 
code from set C. 
Bidders Share the Secret by Additive Sharing: 
1. Each bidder iB divides his secret code into i random values, such that 
∑ ==
i
v vjij
mc
1 ,
1 . 
2. Then each bidder iB  privately sends vjm , to every other bidder )...1( ivBv =∀  
3. Bidder then sums all the bidder shares to compute the additive share 
∑ ==
i
v jvj
m
1
σ  
4. Then these values are collected from bidder to compute kσ . 
Seller Solves the Knapsack Problem: 
1. Seller computes the knapsack value, ∑ ==
i
n nk
q
1
modσσ  
2. If kk c<σ then set 0=kf  and kk σσ =−1 , then set 1=kf and kkk c−=− σσ 1  
3. States of the flags in F are determined by solving the knapsack problem. 
Final Announcement of Winner: 
     1. The seller picks the highest price indicated by the vector F which contains the flags 
corresponding to the prices p. 
2. The seller requests the winning bidder to identify himself. 
3. Bidder proves his case to seller by displaying the secret code. 
 
Example 1: This example has a price set of 9 bidding values with 4 bidders participating 
in the auction. 
• Firstly consider that the seller offering a product for the following 9 bidding 
prices p= {10, 100, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500} all in dollars. 
• Now the seller also chooses a set C with 9 super increasing random integers 
           C= {5, 9, 15, 30, 60, 120, 250, 500, 1000} 
• Pick a prime number q in such a way that q>1984 which we considered to be 
1987 in this example. 
• Consider that they are 4 bidders participating in this bid, the seller chooses 4 
random and independent integers and sets the vector }87,300,700,900{=R
satisfying 900+700+300+87 1987mod0≡ . 
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• Suppose there are 4 bidders },,,{ 4321 BBBBB = willing to bid. 
• Assume that the following bids are made 1B ←10$, 2B ←200$, 3B ←450$, 
4B ←350$ 
 
 
Figure 3 : Auction Protocol 
 
• Now the seller interacts with each bidder through oblivious transfer of strings to 
securely transfer the randomized secret code corresponding to the bidders selected 
price index. 
1B ←5+900mod1987=905 
2B ←15+700mod1987=715 
3B ←500+300mod1987=800 
4B ←120+87mod1987=207 
Now bidder divides his secret code into 4 additive shares 
1B : 200+200+200+305=905 
2B : 100+115+400+100=715 
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            3B : 150+250+100+300=800  
            4B : 50+70+80+7=207 
            Now each bidder computes his additive share  
 1B : 1σ =200+100+150+50=500 
2B : 2σ  =200+115+250+70=635 
            3B : 3σ =200+400+100+80=780  
            4B : 4σ =305+100+300+7=712 
Each bidder sends his additive share to the seller and then the seller computes his 
knapsack problem 
8σ =500+635+780+712=2627mod1987=640 
Now the seller starts solving the knapsack problem and sets of the flag. 
;640,0 8999 ==⇒< σσ fc  
;140500640,1 88888 =−=−=⇒> cfc σσ  
;140,0 6777 ==⇒< σσ fc  
;20120140,1 66666 =−=−=⇒> cfc σσ  
;20,0,),( 345455 ==⇒< σσ ffcc  
51520,1 33333 =−=−=⇒> cfc σσ  
;5,0)( 2222 ==⇒< σσ fc  
1111 =⇒> fcσ  
Final set f={1,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0} and seller announces that the highest price as 450$. The 
winning bidder announces himself by providing his secret 800 to the seller. And second 
highest price can also be announced respectively using the same process. 
 
Example 2: This example has a price set of ten bidding values with 3 bidders 
participating in the bid. 
• For our second example consider that the seller offering a product for the 
following 10 bidding prices p= {100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 
1000} all in dollars. 
• Now the seller also chooses a set C with 10 super increasing random integers 
           C= {3, 7, 15, 30, 65, 140, 320, 650, 1300, 2600} 
• Pick a prime number q in such a way that q>5130 which we considered to be 
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5209  in this example. 
• Consider that they are 3 bidders participating in this bid, the seller chooses 4 
random and independent integers and sets the vector }1209,1500,2500{=R
satisfying 2500+1500+1209 5209mod0≡ . 
• Suppose there are 3 bidders },,{ 321 BBBB = willing to bid. 
• Assume that the following bids are made 1B ←200$, 2B ←400$, 3B ←1000$ 
• Now the seller interacts with each bidder through oblivious transfer of strings to 
securely transfer the randomized secret code corresponding to the bidders selected 
price index. 
1B ←7+2500mod5209=2507 
2B ←30+1500mod5209=1530 
3B ←2600+1209mod5209=3809 
Now bidder divides his secret code into 3 additive shares 
1B : 1000+1000+507=2507 
2B : 530+500+500=1530 
            3B : 1500+809+1500=3809  
             Now each bidder computes his additive share  
 1B : 1σ =1000+530+1500=3030 
2B : 2σ  =1000+500+809=2309 
            3B : 3σ =507+500+1500= 2507 
Each bidder sends his additive share to the seller and then the seller computes his 
knapsack problem 
           8σ =3030+2309+2507=7846mod5209=2637 
Now the seller starts solving the knapsack problem and sets of the flag. 
;3726002637,1 99101010 =−=−=⇒> cfc σσ  
;37,0,,,,),,,,( 46789567899 5 ==⇒< σσ fffffccccc  
;73037,1 44444 =−=−=⇒> cfc σσ  
;7,0)( 3333 ==⇒< σσ fc  
077,1 22222 =−=−=⇒> cfc σσ  
0111 =⇒< fcσ  
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Final set f={0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1} and seller announces that the highest price as 1000$. The 
winning bidder announces himself by providing his secret 2600 to the seller. And second 
highest price can also be announced respectively using the same process. 
 
This auction protocol provides an efficient distribution mechanism by solving the 
knapsack problem and providing security for the bids using additive sharing. We have 
already mentioned that the digital knapsack is not unconditionally secure. There may be 
need therefore to pack extra numbers into it and this can be done by increasing the 
number of participants and by introducing many dummy participants in a range that is 
sure not to be part of the winning bid.  It is also essential to use strong random numbers 
in the use of the protocol [29]. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Tie in Bidding. This auction protocol is built assuming that no two bidders make same 
bid. However if two or more bidders select the same price, they are assigned with same 
values. This initially has no effect on the protocol but by the end of the protocol the seller 
will not be able to solve the knapsack problem correctly leaving room for errors. 
Therefore, the bidders must be able to detect the tie before computing the additive shares.  
So to solve this problem we propose to the use of time stamping of the bids made by the 
bidders. As a result the bidders who bid for the same price later than the once who have 
already placed the bid can be filtered out. This prevents two or more bidders to bid on 
same price.  
 
Network Time Protocol. The Network Time Protocol is a time synchronization protocol 
used to obtain timestamps from a remote server on the internet. This protocol has four 
time values. We use the following equation 
2
)( 34 TT −    to determine the values of offset 
between the server and the client. The calculated offset value is used to estimate the time 
at the local clock in relation to the server’s clock and client’s clock.  
 
 
 
  
 
12 
 
 
Figure 4: Asymmetric propagation delay 
Attacks on Time Synchronization. It is possible that the attacker will use the 
asymmetric time synchronization delays to affect the synchronization. When situations 
like this arise, the network time protocol uses the offset formula. Suppose the client and 
the server are perfectly synchronized. Let us suppose that client sends its request at 
00:00:00 to the server and the server receives it at 1s. The server takes some time to 
process and sends the response to the client at 00:00:05. On the way back to the client the 
attacker delays the response and sends it at 00:00:35 on client’s clock corresponding to 
00:00:20 at server’s clock. The attacker delays the clock by 15 seconds. The maximum 
error can be defined by above mentioned equation. 
 
Experiment. I conducted an experiment by creating a fake auction and asked several 
individuals to place their bids on the prices they are willing to pay for the products I 
placed in the bid. I noted the timestamp depending on the bidding time of each 
participant. The following table is one among 5 experiments. 
Whenever a bidder places his/her bid respective timestamp is recorded, this timestamp is 
considered when the seller encounters a tie in the bid.  In the above table we can observe 
that there is a tie between the bidders B and A which can be solved by going through the 
timestamps of their bids. The timestamp of B is 2.907 whereas the timestamp of A is 
0ms 
1ms 5ms 
15ms 20ms 35ms 
1ms 
Offset -15ms 
SERVER 
CLIENT 
where:                       0ms-( )                   1ms-( )                    
5ms-( )                35ms-( ) 
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2.826 which is earlier than that of B. So the tie can be broke and secret code will be 
assigned to A. 
Auction ID Bidding Prices Bidder Name Time Stamp Final Price 
1 120 P 2.654 120 
1 60 S 2.712 120 
1 80 B 2.907 120 
1 80 A 2.826 120 
1 100 C 2.900 120 
Table 1: Bids with Timestamps 
 
Figure 5: Timestamps for bids placed by bidders 
 
Selection of Price Set. We observe that p is set of prices the seller offers the bidders for 
their selection. The seller should make sure that the price set are selected in such a way 
that the count of prices is greater than the total participants in a bid. This is possible when 
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the seller has knowledge on the number of participants in a bid prior auction. Asking the 
bidders to register for the auction will help the seller managing the count of the bidders. 
Registration of bidders. All the participants of the auction are required to register for the 
auction. The registration may contain the Bidder Bi for its IP address, the ID of the 
auction he/she intends to participate and also signature of the bidder on the above 
information. 
Example: Auctions in eBay uses fixed end time but allows users to bid multiple number 
of times. Last minute bidding is a common practice, usually called as sniping, which 
arises despite advise from sellers in eBay that bidders should simply submit bids that 
represents their maximum willingness to pay. eBay instructs bidders that they do not 
accept complaints on last minute bidding. 
By choosing a price set before the auction gives a chance to the potential bidder to bid the 
price. The reason why we might see snipers on eBay is that sniping is considered the best 
response to a variety of strategies. But sniping in an auction with fixed deadline, in which 
very late bids have some probability of not being successfully placed will totally depend 
on the count of irrational bidders. There can be equilibria even in pure private values 
auctions where the bidders might have the privilege to bid late which gives higher profits 
to the successful bidders.  
 
The graph of Figure 6 is plotted between the price and the bids placed in an auction. We 
observe that these are bids placed for a wide range of prices. Unlike eBay these auctions 
do not allows bidders to make multiple bids, which not only prevents sniping but also 
prevents the bidders from having extra privilege of winning the bid.  
Malicious Participants. Each participant should be committed to the values he/she 
selects during the execution of the protocol. It may happen that the malicious participant 
may try to tamper with the values. This can be avoided by reconstructing the complete 
protocol again considering a different set of secret values. This also validates the 
submitted shares and also by secret keys of respective participants. 
 
Although each bidder is allowed to place a bid, any malicious manipulation (such as 
tampering or manipulating another bidder’s field or values) will be detected by the seller. 
The seller is conscious of any malicious action if a bidder has taken an error action, or it 
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may also be possible for the seller not able to retrieve information from any field of 
bidder, in this case the seller can identify the tampering of the system.  
 
 
Figure 6:  Bids and Prices Placed in a Bid 
 
The steps involved in recovery of the system depend on where the error was detected. 
Disqualified bidders. It may happen that some of the participants are disqualified due to 
malicious behavior.  The detection of the malicious participant may affect the protocol 
depending on the where they are detected.   
If the bidder is halted before the oblivious transfer of the secret code then the seller 
simply discards him from the protocol and continues the execution with the remaining 
bidders. 
If recognized after transferring the secret code but before the additive secret sharing then 
the bid should be discarded. 
If found after the sharing of the secret codes then the bidders are made to re-share the 
secret code and continue the protocol. 
CONCLUSION 
This survey analyzes the digital knapsack based secure online auction protocol. Although 
the digital knapsack is a cryptographically weak trapdoor function, it can be modified by 
increasing its size to increase its security to an extent that it is sufficient for an online 
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auction. We describe several limitations of the protocol like detecting and solving the tie 
between bidders, malicious behavior of participants and also selection of price set by the 
seller. We propose solutions to the current limitations of the digital knapsack-based 
online auction protocol. 
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